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BOOK REVIEW
WHERE THE LAW ENDS:
BEHAVIOR.

THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE

By Christopher D. Stone.* New York: Harper & Row,

Publishers. 1975. pp. xiii, 273. $12.95.
Dale A. Normington**
There has been a growing concern recently that many of society's ills are a result of a lack of social responsibility on the part
of America's business corporations. The corporation is portrayed as
acting without regard for the public welfare or the morality of its
decision. Pollution, lack of product safety, bribery, political intrigue, financial frauds, energy abuses and even inflation are among
the charges leveled against corporations. If the corporation is made
more "socially responsible," it is argued, its impact on the "quality
of life" will be positive and beneficial. The advocates of corporate
responsibility have proposed many solutions to effect this result. As
corporate abuses seemingly increase in number and magnitude, the
clamor for corporate responsibility has intensified, while the debate
over which solution provides the best remedy continues.
In the midst of this controversy, Christopher Stone's Where the
Law Ends is an innovative, controversial and far-reaching alternative proposal for attempting to solve the question of how corporations can be made a more responsible force in our society. His
thoughtful and imaginative approach to the corporate responsibility
issue is consistent with his novel premise regarding environmental
protection issues in his previous book, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects.'
Professor Stone contends that the present legal system is ineffectual in causing corporations to act responsibly. The law considers
a corporation to be a persona ficta, a "legal fiction," to which the
laws governing individuals are equally applicable in their deterrent
effect. Through studies of various cases.of corporate irresponsibility
(financial collapse, financial fraud, product defects, and pollution),
Stone argues that the law should not treat the corporate structure
in the same manner as it treats individuals. The notions of human
* Professor, University of Southern California Law Center. A.B., 1959, Harvard University; LL.B., 1962, Yale University.
** Assistant Professor, University of Dayton School of Law. B.A., 1966, University of
Akron; J.D., 1969, University of Akron.
1.
OBJECTS

C.

STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL

(1974).
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behavior and motivation have been transferred to the corporation,
and it is this fallacy which precludes a satisfactory solution to the
problems created by corporations. The corporation cannot be imprisoned, a large fine is viewed by corporate managers as only one
of many business concerns, and the courts may be reluctant to
impose onerous damage awards on corporations in any event.! The
American corporation is not as profit-oriented as was thought and
attempting to regulate corporate behavior on a "cost" basis "is no
guarantee that the corporation will respond as we should like." 3
In addition to, or as an alternative to the corporation as the
source against whom the law can provide sanctions for irresponsible
behavior is the "key" corporate individual. Stone argues these sanctions are also ineffectual. Corporations protect top executives by
diffusing the information process and allow "key" individuals to
profess ignorance of corporate wrongdoing. Responsibility for their
actions may then fall on an individual other than the decisionmaker.' Even if knowledge can be traced to the highest level of the
corporate hierarchy, the standards of proof make a finding of liability difficult. Further, the corporate executive has the security of
indemnification and liability insurance as an additional protection.
Professor Stone believes that the law must be changed, in order
to encourage corporations to prevent problems. Rather than relying
on threats to the corporation, a separate system of laws must be
formulated to deal with corporations as institutions and not persons. The present laws which treat the corporation as an institution
deal primarily with the internal relationships between management
and shareholders and do not focus on the corporation's effect on the
public. Stone seems to imply that the advocates of Federal Chartering5 and federal corporate minimum standards' are merely continuing the misdirection of the law's emphasis. What is needed, he
argues, is an emphasis on the corporation's perceptions or
information-gathering systems. The legal system must move
"toward an increasingly direct focus on the processes of corporate
2. For examples of the rationale of protecting the corporate investor from damage
awards which would cause financial ruin to a corporation, see Rogensky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.) and S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
3.

C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 57 (1975).

4. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
5. See, e.g., THE CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING IN CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA, 67
(Nader and Green ed. 1973); Henning, Federal Corporate Charteringfor Big Business: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come? 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 915 (1972).
6. Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 1101
(1974).
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decision-making, at least as a supplement to the traditional strategies that largely await upon the corporate acts."7 It may be that the
effect of the law is understated, but the arguments are persuasive.
The main thrust of Stone's proposals is aimed at changing the
cognitive processes of the corporation. If presented with the opportunity to reflect on the consequences of their actions, corporate
managers will make a responsible decision. Fully informed, a corporate manager will act to stop product defects, pollution, and illegal
corporate payments. This premise may seem too optimistic in its
assumptions, but it is aimed at the source of the problem. The first
change Stone proposes is a revision of the board of directors: inside
directors in corporations of major impact would be eliminated; the
functions of directors would be specifically defined; directors' liability standards would include, as a supplement to liability for gross
negligence, liability for failure to perform the specified functions;
and, indemnification and liability insurance would be eliminated.
In addition, certain designated categories of information would have
to be brought to the board's attention. Stone recognizes, however,
that these reforms would only be a beginning in revising the corporate decision-making process.
General Public Directors (primarily semi-retired or retired executives and academics) would be appointed by the federal government in defined percentages to corporations with over $1 billion in
sales or assets with approval and removal authority resting in the
corporation. These public directors would hopefully serve a greater
function, "a more, obtrusive, nagging reminder of these companies'
obligations to society than the American flag over their plants." 8
They would have authority to perform "legal audits" to assure that
laws were being complied with, to propose remedial plans, to serve
as liaison in proposing legislation and trade standards, to ensure
that internal systems were effective, and to act as receivers of information from anyone in the corporation who might "blow the whistle" on something which was seriously wrong in the corporation.
Special Public Directors could also be appointed to any corporation
demonstrating repeated violations of the law. In addition to the
recidivist corporations, special directors would be appointed to companies in industries having particular problems such as industrially
caused cancer, product safety or pollution.
Professor Stone emphasizes that the issue of corporate responsibility should focus on how a corporation decides and not on what it
7. C. STONE, supra note 3, at 121.
8. Id. at 174.
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decides. He argues that further or alternative reforms focusing on
other factors than the board of directors may be needed. For example, the corporation "information net" should be revitalized. Specially qualified individuals could be interjected into the corporate
system at various levels below the board, given special powers and
made responsible for performing certain tasks in an effort to head
off problems before they occur. An outside agency could pass upon
a corporation's organizational structure to ensure an effective operation and information flow. Controls could be placed on a corporation's internal information processes requiring that certain information be collected and forwarded to the decision-makers, in effect
forcing them to consider all the information available in making a
decision. Stone is hopeful that this would force the manager to make
the morally "right" decision, but at the very least, it would seem
that the manager could no longer claim ignorance. Additional reforms advocated include giving of new powers to government inspectors to seek out problems by going directly into the corporation's
information system, and establishing protections which expose corporate violations. Finally, Stone proposes that the board of directors
be required to vote on those corporate decisions which are "likely
to have a critical social impact."9 In addition, before a corporation
could act in a designated area it would have to make certain findings analogous to an environmental impact statement.
Professor Stone argues that "vague and airy demands,"'" made
in the abstract, will not give society the corporate responsibility it
demands. "[Sipecific impositions on the corporation's inner, traditionally 'private' processes"" are needed. He is quick to point out
that his suggestions have many limitations. Further, Stone has recently admitted some misgivings about the placement of public
directors on the board and the conflicts which could result.'
This reviewer feels that more focus was needed on the specifics
of the manner in which, and by whom, many of the reforms would
be implemented. The impact of these internal conflicting goals on
the effectiveness and efficiency of the corporate operation has not
been adequately considered, and it is foreseeable that many objections will be made to such drastic restructuring of the corporation.
However, in spite of the problems inherent in implementing Professor Stone's proposals, a substantial addition has been made to the
9. Id.at 219.
10. Id. at 227.
ll. Id.
12. C. Stone, Public Directors Merit A Try, 54 HARV. Bus. REV. 20 (Mar.-Apr. 1976).
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debate on the question of how to achieve corporate responsibility.
One reviewer has gone so far as to state, "any future discussion of
social responsibility that ignores this book will simply be irrelevant."' 3 Certainly, this book must be given consideration in dealing
with this issue. Professor Stone has recognized that his book is not
a panacea when he suggested its purpose: "I like to think that some
of the ideas in this book, expanded upon by others, will suggest the
steps we might now begin to consider."' 4
13.
14.

Lieberman, Book Review, Bus. WEEK 7 (Aug. 25, 1975).
C. STONE, supra note 3, at 248.

Published by eCommons, 1976

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol1/iss2/12

